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THE CASE FOR A LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT AGAINST
‘ACCESSORY COPYRIGHT’ FOR GREY MARKET PRODUCTS:
WHAT CAN THE U.S. LEARN FROM SINGAPORE AND
AUSTRALIA?
Irene Calboli∗ and Mary LaFrance∗∗
In this article, we suggest that the U.S. Congress could implement a legislative provision prohibiting
copyright protection for incidental product features in the context of parallel imports. The U.S. would
not be the first country to implement such a provision. In 1994, Singapore pioneered the adoption of
a similar provision, which was introduced as an amendment to the SG 1987 Copyright Act. A few
years later, in 1998, Australia incorporated a similar amendment to its Aust. Copyright Act 1968.
In this article, we analyse in detail the Singapore and Australia provisions and, building upon these
provisions, we suggest a specific amendment that the U.S. Congress could introduce into the U.S.
Copyright Act of 1976.
I. Introduction
In the U.S., as in most other countries, intellectual property rights are limited by the
principle of intellectual property exhaustion (“the exhaustion principle”, also known
as “the first sale rule”). According to this principle, the intellectual property rights in
a product are exhausted after the product has been first sold into the market under the
authority of intellectual property owners. A bedrock of intellectual property theory,
the exhaustion principle balances the exclusive rights of intellectual property own-
ers vis-à-vis the rights of the purchasers or the users of the products to freely sell,
lend, or gift the products after they have purchased or otherwise lawfully obtained
the products in the marketplace. While generally accepted with respect to product
distribution within national markets, the application of this principle remains con-
troversial in the context of international trade and parallel imports (genuine grey
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forthcoming in the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Law, the Intellectual
Property Journal, the Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, and the International
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market products imported without authorisation, usually from lower-cost countries
to higher-cost countries).1 Generally, intellectual property owners oppose parallel
imports because these imports interfere with their ability to segment international
markets and charge different prices for the same products in different jurisdictions.
In contrast, other businesses—independent importers, wholesalers, many distribu-
tors, and second hand dealers—favour grey market products due to the fact that
their businesses benefit from the cheaper prices brought about by these products.
National governments also adopt divergent positions favouring or opposing paral-
lel imports, based on the advantages or disadvantages (in terms of product pricing,
product availability, or threat to national businesses) that parallel imports may bring
to their respective national economies.2 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights did not mandate (nor
could reach) any harmonised position,3 and countries remain free to follow their
preferred approach.
In general, countries worldwide follow one of three separate approaches with
respect to the exhaustion principle and the legality of parallel imports. First, under
‘national exhaustion’, intellectual property rights are considered exhausted only
with respect to the products that have been sold domestically, and parallel imports
are considered to be infringing products; second, under ‘international exhaustion’,
intellectual property rights are considered exhausted with respect to the products
that have been sold both domestically and internationally, and parallel imports are
considered lawful imports; third (and the less frequent approach), under ‘regional
exhaustion’, intellectual property rights are considered exhausted with respect to sales
that have occurred in countries that are members of a specific regional group, like the
E.U., where parallel imports are lawful across E.U. members while parallel imports
from outside the E.U. are considered as infringing imports. The U.S., in particular,
adopts a principle of national exhaustion in patent law (banning parallel imports
of patented products)4 and a principle of international exhaustion in trademark law
1 In this article, we use the terms “parallel imports” and “grey market goods” interchangeably. In gen-
eral, on the topic, see Christopher Heath, “Parallel Imports and International Trade” (1997) 28 Int’l
Rev. Ind. Prop. & C’right L. 623; John C. Hilke, “Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the
Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports” Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission, Working Paper No. 150 (February 1987); Herman Cohen Jehoram, “Prohibition of
Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights” (1999) 30 Int’l Rev. Ind. Prop. & C’right L. 495.
2 For a detailed review of the regulation of parallel imports in Asia, for example, see the various con-
tributions in Christopher Heath, ed., Max Planck Series on Asian Intellectual Property Law: Parallel
Imports in Asia, vol. 9 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004).
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, (1994) 33
I.L.M. 83, art. 6 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPs]. Article 6 provides that nothing in the
Agreement can “be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights”. See
S.K. Verma, “Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the TRIPS Agree-
ments” (1998) 29 Int’l Rev. Ind. Prop. & C’right L. 534 at 535, 536; Vincent Chiappetta, “The Desirability
of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things”
(2000) 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 333.
4 The U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. does not explicitly limit the first sale rule in patent law to national
sales. Courts, however, have consistently ruled that sale of products made in a foreign countries do not
exhaust domestic patent rights. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 at 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2005): “[t]he patentee’s authorization of an international first sale does not affect exhaustion
of that patentee’s rights in the United States.”
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(permitting parallel imports of trademarked products).5 Until early 2013, the U.S.’s
position on the territorial application of the principle of copyright exhaustion was
unclear, although the majority of the courts seemed to support an interpretation of
the Copyright Act of 19766 favouring national copyright exhaustion. In March 2013,
the Supreme Court of the U.S. reversed this interpretation in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. and clarified that the U.S. applies international exhaustion in copyright
law.7
Still, for several years, the general assumption was that the U.S. followed a prin-
ciple of national exhaustion in copyright law, at least with respect to foreign-made
products, and international exhaustion in trademark law. Accordingly, because of
this difference, many businesses turned to the protection offered by copyright law in
order to find that relief against parallel imports that they could not find under the rule
of trademark law. Hence, since many commercial products do not qualify for copy-
right protection (because they are functional or do not meet the required standard
of originality) businesses claimed protection for incidental product features—such
as logos, labels, packaging, or owner’s manuals—that could qualify for copyright
protection. Then, based upon the copyright in these incidental features, businesses
started to claim that the unauthorised importation of products carrying those features
constituted copyright infringement.8 For the time being, the decision in Kirtsaeng
ended this opportunistic exploitation of copyright law. As we note in this article, how-
ever, the effects of Kirtsaeng may be short-lived, as pressure seems to be mounting
within the U.S. Congress to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision. Should Congress
overturn the decision—and Congress announced the need for comprehensive copy-
right reforms a few weeks after Kirtsaeng was issued—the U.S. would again find
itself with different territorial rules in copyright and trademark exhaustion. This, in
turn, would revive the trend of claiming copyright protection for incidental product
features as an end-run around international trademark exhaustion. This ending, how-
ever, could be avoided. To this effect, in this article, we suggest that the U.S. Congress
could implement a legislative provision prohibiting copyright protection for inciden-
tal product features in the context of parallel imports. The U.S. would not be the first
country to implement such a provision. In 1994, Singapore pioneered the adoption
of a similar provision, which was introduced as an amendment9 to the Singapore
Copyright Act 1987.10 A few years later, in 1998, Australia incorporated a similar
amendment in its Copyright Act 1968.11 In this article, we analyse in detail the
Singapore and Australia provisions and, building upon these provisions, we suggest
5 See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 4th ed., looseleaf (Eagan:
Thomson Reuters, 2013) at para. 29:46.
6 Infra note 18.
7 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) [Kirtsaeng].
8 For an early description on this practice, see Donna K. Hintz, “Battling Gray Market Goods With
Copyright Law” (1994) 57 Alb. L. Rev. 1187 at 1191 et seq. For a critique, see Teresa Scassa, “Using
Copyright Law to Prevent Parallel Importation: A Comment on Kraft Canada, Inc. v. Euro Excellence,
Inc.” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 409 at 410.
9 Sing., Copyright (Amendment) Act, No. 14 of 1994 [1994 Amendment Act].
10 Sing., Copyright Act 1987, No. 2 of 1987 [SG 1987 Copyright Act] (revised as the Copyright Act
(Cap. 63, 1988 Rev. Ed. Sing.)), as am. by 1994 Amendment Act, ibid. See now Copyright Act (Cap. 63,
2006 Rev. Ed. Sing.), ss. 7(1), 40A(1), 116A(1) [SG 2006 Copyright Act].
11 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.), ss. 10(1), 44C, 112C, as am. by Copyright Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998
(Cth.).
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a specific amendment that Congress could introduce into the U.S. Copyright Act of
1976.12
II. Gray Market Products and Intellectual Property
Exhaustion in the U.S.: How the Supreme Court Stopped
(For Now) the ‘Accessory Copyright’ Game
In the U.S., the admissibility of parallel imports of consumer goods is regulated
primarily under trademark law (provided that the products are not protected under
patent law). Based upon the premise that trademarks are not protected as property,
but only as indicators of commercial origin for consumers, U.S. trademark law allows
the importation of genuine goods carrying a trademark protected in the U.S. as long
as consumers are not confused as to the origin or quality of the imported products.13
The traditional justification for this rule rests on the pro-competitive policy objec-
tives of trademark law. Specifically, this rule derives from the principle that the
public should be allowed to benefit from the lower prices that usually accompany
grey market products and that trademark owners should not be allowed to control
downstream distribution after the products have been legitimately sold in the mar-
ketplace, even if the sale takes place outside the U.S. Trademark owners can thus
prevent parallel imports only when the imported products carry a mark that is iden-
tical with, or confusingly similar to, the mark that is registered and/or used by an
unrelated business entity.14 Without this protection, consumers could believe that
the products originate from the U.S. trademark owner instead of the foreign owner.
Still, anytime that both the foreign mark and the U.S. mark are “owned by the same
person or business entity”, grey market goods can be lawfully imported, including
when the marks’ ownership is “subjected to common ownership and control”.15 As
the only exception to this rule, trademark owners can object to the importation of
grey market products that are of a ‘materially different’ quality from the goods that
trademark owners sell in the domestic market. Here, again, the rationale of this rule
rests on the possibility that consumers could be confused as to the quality of the
products should two seemingly identical products of materially different quality be
12 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. [U.S. Copyright Act of 1976]. In this article, we also note that
the Office for the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) seems to support, or at least is not opposed,
to a similar solution as part of the ongoing negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(“TPP”), which is currently being negotiated between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the U.S.: see the 30 August
2013 draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property [Rights] Chapter Consolidated Text,
art. QQ.G.3, n. 135, online: WikiLeaks <http://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-
treaty-IP-chapter.pdf> [TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013]. See also the discussion below at Parts
II, III and IV.
13 McCarthy, supra note 5 at para. 29:46.
14 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1124, 1125(b). See also Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006).
15 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 at 289 (1988), citing the Custom Service regulation, 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1987) (stressing that protection under the Tariff Act of 1930, ibid., § 1526(a) is
exclusively for domestic U.S. trademark owners that have no corporate affiliation with the foreign man-
ufacturer). This rule aims at preventing strategic trademark assignments between companies controlled
by the same entities across different national markets to bypass the rule of international trademark
exhaustion. See also McCarthy, supra note 5 at para. 29:49.
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offered for sale in the national market.16 As an exception to this exception, however,
the U.S. Customs Service’s regulation was amended in the late 1990s in order to
permit the importation of materially different grey market products in the instances
where the importers have properly labelled the products to notify consumers of the
difference in qualities.17 In these instances, the labels affixed to the products are con-
sidered sufficient to dispel the potential consumer confusion that could otherwise be
created in the market, and consumers should benefit from the additional competition
and choices brought about by grey market products.
Because of the impossibility, or at least the difficulties, in resorting to trade-
mark law, businesses have traditionally looked at legal alternatives to block parallel
imports and segment the international distribution of their products. For example,
businesses frequently turn to contract law as a means to restrict product distribution
in the after-sale markets. An additional alternative seemed to be provided, however,
under the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. In particular, even though § 109(a) of the
Act states that the owners of copyrighted works “lawfully made under this title” are
entitled “to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that [work]” “without the
authority of the copyright owner”,18 § 602(a)(1) provides that the “[i]mportation
into the United States” of a copyrighted work acquired outside the U.S. “without the
authority of the [copyright] owner” is “an infringement of the exclusive right [of]
distribut[ion]”.19 Reading the two provisions together, businesses and the majority
of the courts concluded that § 602(a)(1) of theAct barred the importation of grey mar-
ket copyrighted products even when the products had been “lawfully made” and first
distributed in foreign countries under the authorisation of copyright owners.20 Only
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that § 109(a) limited the importation
right in § 602(a)(1) and equally applied to national and international sales.21 Still,
as we indicated in Part I, consumer products usually do not qualify for copyright
protection in their entirety because they are frequently useful/functional products
or do not meet the necessary level of originality required for protecting works of
16 See Lever Brothers Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lever Brothers Company
v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In these decisions, the Court of Appeals for District of
Columbia stated that trademarks applied to physically different goods are not “genuine” for American
consumers.
17 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b):
Goods determined by the Customs Service to be physically and materially different… shall not be
detained… where the merchandise or its packaging bears a conspicuous and legible label designed
to remain on the product until the first point of sale… The label must be in close proximity to the
trademark as it appears in its most prominent location on the article itself or the retail package or
container. Other information designed to dispel consumer confusion may also be added.
See also McCarthy, supra note 5 at para. 29:50.
18 U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 12, § 109(a) (2008). Copyright exhaustion was created as a
judicial doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) [Bobbs-Merrill]. In 1909,
the principle was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. See Quality
King, infra note 23 at 141, 142: “Congress subsequently codified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the
exclusive right to ‘vend’ was limited to first sales of the work.”
19 U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, ibid., § 602(a)(1).
20 Some of the most important decisions in this respect came from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit: see Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996); Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318
(9th Cir. 1991).
21 See e.g., Sebastian International Inc. v Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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authorship. Consumer products nonetheless frequently include non-useful decora-
tive features that can pass the (low threshold) test for copyright protection, namely
packaging, labels, tags, instructions, and owner’s manuals. In addition, ornamen-
tal designs or software embedded in the products generally qualify for copyright
protection. Accordingly, businesses started to claim copyright protection for these
incidental product features, and in some cases even registered these features with
the U.S. Copyright Office. Then, they leveraged the copyright protection in these
features against the unauthorised imports of the products carrying these features, and
asserted that the importation of these products amounted to copyright infringement.22
In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court partially stopped this trend in Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.23—a case about shampoo
bottles carrying copyrighted labels. In this case, the Court found that the copyright
in the labels affixed to the products had been exhausted, even if the products had been
imported from overseas. Still, in Quality King, the court found that § 109(a) applied
primarily, if not only because the products had been made domestically before hav-
ing been exported and later reimported into the U.S. (the so-called round trip).24
Although the court did not address whether § 109(a) and the exhaustion principle
also applied to foreign-made grey market products, which were later imported into
the U.S., its reasoning seemed to imply that they would not. As a result, many,
including the Office for the U.S. Trade Representative, argued that the U.S. still
followed a system of national copyright exhaustion with respect to foreign-made
products and that § 109(a) applied only to domestically-made products.25 This dis-
criminatory approach to exhaustion on the basis of the place of manufacture was very
problematic, however, in an increasingly integrated and global economy in which
products, or pieces of them, are regularly manufactured and assembled across mul-
tiple jurisdictions. In 2010, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the territorial
22 In one instance, this practice was found to be copyright misuse: see Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., No. 04-05443 at 2 (C.D. Cal. 2011). An appeal on this case is currently pending in the Ninth
Circuit: see Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. 2012).
23 523 U.S. 135 (1998) [Quality King].
24 Ibid. at 139.
25 In particular, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, 24 October 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [U.S.-Jordan
FTA], the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, 15 June 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 [U.S.-Morocco
FTA] and the February 2011 and August 2013 (leaked) drafts of the “Intellectual Property Chapter”
of the TPP include a provision stating, with minimal variations, that “[e]ach Party shall provide to
authors, performers, and producers of phonograms the right to authorize or prohibit the importation
into that Party’s territory of copies of the work, performance, or phonogram made without authoriza-
tion, or made outside that Party’s territory with the authorization of the author, performer, or producer
of the phonogram”: see U.S.-Jordan FTA, ibid., art. 4(11); U.S.-Morocco FTA, ibid., art. 15.5(2);
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights: Draft—February 10, 2011, art. 4.2, online:
<http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf> [TPP IP Chapter Draft
Feb. 2011];. TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12, art. QQ.G.3. Interestingly, however, the
latest TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013 also includes a provision contradicting this rule and favouring
international exhaustion, which is supported by all TPP members with the exception of the U.S. and
Australia: see TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, ibid., art. QQ.G.17: [CL/NZ/SG/MY/BN/VN/PE/MX
propose; AU/US oppose: The Parties are encouraged to establish international exhaustion of rights.]
[footnote numbers omitted].” The same provision indicates that Canada proposes an alternative ‘exhaus-
tion neutral’ option: “[CA propose: Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the freedom of the Parties to
determine whether and under what conditions the exhaustion of copyright and related rights applies.]”
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scope of copyright exhaustion in Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A.26—a
case about Swiss-made grey market watches carrying a small copyrighted insignia
and imported into the U.S. without Omega’s consent. Yet the Justices could not even
reach a majority in the case due in part to Justice Kagan’s recusal. An equally divided
Court thus affirmed without explanation27 the decision on appeal—ruling against the
importers.28 Only in March 2013 did the Supreme Court finally clarify the issue in
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., ruling that the exhaustion principle in § 109(a)
applies equally to products “lawfully made” in the U.S. and those “lawfully made”
in foreign countries.29 In his majority opinion, Justice Breyer rejected a “geograph-
ical” application of § 109(a) and concluded that the language in § 109(a) does not,
and cannot, refer to the actual place where the products are “made.”30 Instead, Jus-
tice Breyer wrote that § 109(a) should be interpreted as referring to any copies that
have been “made” so as to meet the requirement of national copyright law—that is,
as made “with the permission of” the copyright owner, or “in accordance with” or
“in compliance with” their instructions,31 regardless of the actual place where these
copies were made and first sold.
The majority opinion, however, was not unanimous. Notably, Justice Kagan,
joined by Justice Alito, submitted a concurring opinion wherein she explained
that the majority decision was necessary in light of Quality King,32 which had
incorrectly applied copyright exhaustion unevenly to domestically-made and foreign-
made goods. The concurring opinion explained, in particular, that Justices Kagan and
Alito had joined the majority primarily to rectify the wrongs of Quality King rather
than because they were fully convinced that Congress wanted to establish a principle
of international copyright exhaustion.33 The opinion even seemed to advocate that
Congress should amend § 602(1)(a)—notably it hinted that, “[i]f Congress thinks
copyright owners need greater power to restrict importation… a ready solution is at
hand”, Congress could clarify that § 602(a)(1) applies to all products imported into
the U.S.34 In addition, Justice Ginsburg issued a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy
in full and by Justice Scalia in part,35 in which she stressed that U.S. copyright law
is based on the principle of territoriality, and foreign sales should not be consid-
ered to exhaust the right of the copyright owners in the U.S.36 Justice Ginsburg also
noted, correctly, that the position of the majority was in conflict with the position
repeatedly taken by the U.S. in international trade agreements, that copyright owners
should have the right “to prevent the unauthorised importation of copies of their work
26 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
27 Ibid.
28 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
29 133 S. Ct. 1351 at 1358 (2013) (supporting that § 109(a) also applies “where, as here, copies are
manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright owner”).
30 Ibid. at 1355, 1356.
31 Ibid. at 1358.
32 Ibid. at 1372, 1373 (Kagan J., concurring).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. at 1373 et seq. (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
36 Ibid. at 1373, stating that the position of the majority was “at odds with Congress’aim to protect copyright
owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted
works.”
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sold abroad.”37 The USTR has consistently argued that the U.S.’s official position
on copyright exhaustion is national exhaustion, at least with respect to foreign man-
ufactured products after Quality King—a position that has been adopted in the free
trade agreements (“FTAs”) with Jordan38 and Morocco,39 and has been repeatedly
supported by the USTR in the ongoing negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (“TPP”).40
It is thus easy to imagine that, while parallel importers, wholesalers, libraries, and
museums celebrated the decision in Kirtsaeng, copyright-intensive industries (pub-
lishers, entertainment industries, software producers, and multinational corporations)
were likely to lobby Congress to overrule the decision with a legislative amendment.
Perhaps simply a coincidence, just one day after the Court issued the decision in Kirt-
saeng, Maria Pallante, the U.S. Register of Copyrights, publicly stated that the time
had come for Congress to undertake necessary copyright reforms and bring Amer-
ican copyright law in line with the challenges of the twenty-first century.41 A few
weeks later, in April 2013, Representative Goodlatte announced that Congress was
considering a major and comprehensive review of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.42
Hearings on comprehensive copyright reforms started in May 2013 and are ongoing
in Congress.43 Although neither Ms. Pallante nor Representative Goodlatte singled
out the decision in Kirtsaeng in their remarks, the issue of the territorial applica-
tion of copyright exhaustion certainly remains front and centre of possible copyright
reforms. In particular, as advocated by Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion, Congress
will certainly discuss the post-Kirtsaeng application of the importation rights under
§ 602(1)(a), which now applies only to pirated copies. In addition, the position that
the U.S. adopted in the two above-mentioned FTAs and that the USTR is currently
supporting as part of the TPP negotiations, no longer aligns with the post-Kirtsaeng
interpretation of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. Considering that copyright owners
have a lot at stake in this battle—notably not only their ability to block grey market
products imported into the U.S., but also (perhaps more importantly) their ability
to segment international markets in general—copyright owners are likely to cite
37 Ibid. at 1384. Justice Ginsburg also stressed that “[t]he Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is
all the more stunning, for it places the United States at the vanguard of the movement of ‘international
exhaustion’ of copyrights—a movement that the United States has steadfastly resisted on the world
stage”: ibid. at 1373.
38 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 25, art. 4(11).
39 U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 25, art. 15.5(2).
40 TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12, arts. QQ.G.3, QQ.G.17.
41 See U.S., The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law Before the Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property and the Internet, 113th Cong. (2013) (Maria A. Pallante), online: United
States House of Representatives: Committee on the Judiciary <http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
113th/03202013/Pallante%20032013.pdf>.
42 House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R.-Va.) announced, on 24 April 2013, a
comprehensive review of U.S. copyright law over the coming months: see United States House of
Representatives: Committee on the Judiciary, Press Release, “Chairman Goodlatte Announces Com-
prehensive Review of Copyright Law” (24 April 2013), online: United States House of Representatives:
Committee on the Judiciary <http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/04242013_2.html>.
43 For a detailed and updated summary of the ongoing Congressional hearings on copyright reforms,
see Tamlin H. Basan, “Stakeholders Hopeful Open Approach Bodes Well for Goodlatte’s Copyright
Reform Efforts” Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (2 October 2013), online: Bloomberg BNA
<http://www.bna.com/stakeholders-hopeful-open-n17179877492/>.
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these international agreements in urging Congress to overturn Kirtsaeng.44 Should
Congress do so, however, this would restore the incentive for trademark owners to
use copyright protection in order to block the importation of otherwise lawful prod-
ucts. To prevent this, the U.S. should put in place specific mechanisms that would
prevent the return to the opportunistic exploitation of copyright protection as an end-
run around trademark protection. Among possible initiatives, the U.S. could enact a
legislative amendment shielding parallel importers from copyright infringement for
unauthorised imports of incidental (accessory) product features. As we elaborate in
Part III, such a position has already been adopted both by Singapore and Australia.
The analysis of these respective jurisdictions can provide useful examples for the
U.S. to follow, with some necessary adaptations.
III. Crafting Legislation Against ‘Accessory Copyright’: What
Can the U.S. Learn from Singapore and Australia
A. The Singaporean Model: Combining a Legislative Prohibition Against
‘Accessory Copyright’ and International Copyright Exhaustion
Like the U.S., Singapore follows a system of international exhaustion with respect to
trademark law and favours the importation of grey market products into the national
territory. In particular, Singapore’s trademark law directly allows the importation
of grey market products carrying marks that are protected in Singapore as long as
these products have been sold with the consent of the trademark owners anywhere
in the world.45 Singapore’s interpretation of the trademark owners’ consent is gen-
erally very broad, and includes express and implied consent, as well as conditional
consent—that is, grey market products are considered legitimate imports also when
trademark owners consented to their sale abroad but restricted their further distribu-
tion to a prescribed territory.46 Based on the principle of territoriality of trademark
protection, however, unauthorised imports of goods carrying a mark protected in Sin-
gapore can be stopped at the border and considered trademark infringement when
44 In the early 2000s, pressure in this sense was made to New Zealand, which follows a principle of interna-
tional copyright exhaustion since 1998: see Copyright (Removal of Prohibition on Parallel Importing)
Amendment Act 1998 (N.Z.), 1988/20, online: Parliamentary Counsel Office <http://www.legislation.
govt.nz/act/public/1998/0020/latest/DLM426040.html>. In 2003, due to this pressure, New Zealand
introduced some limitations in favour of films. New Zealand could be obliged to further review their
current law, should the TPP adopt the position advocated by the U.S. against international copyright
exhaustion. A similar shift could be required by Singapore and several other negotiating parties to the
TPP: see TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12, arts. QQ.G.3, QQ.G.17.
45 Sing., Trade Marks Act 1998, No. 46 of 1998. Now, Trade Marks Act (Cap. 322, 2005 Rev. Ed. Sing.),
s. 29 [SG Trade Marks Act]. Section 29 of the SG Trade Marks Act 1998 is modelled after s. 12 of
the Trade Marks Act 1994 (U.K.), 1994, c. 26. For a detailed overview of similarities and differences
between the Singapore and English trademark laws, see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, “Exhaustion of Rights in
Trade Mark Law: The English and Singapore Models Compared” [2000] E.I.P.R. 320. For a detailed
overview of parallel imports in Singapore, see also Ng-Loy Wee Loon, “Exhaustion and Parallel Imports
in Singapore” in Heath, supra note 2, 137; GeorgeWei, “Parallel Imports and Intellectual Property Rights
in Singapore” (1990) 2 Sing. Ac. L.J. 286.
46 SG Trade Marks Act, ibid., s. 29(1). See Burton Ong, “The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law
and Competition Law in Singapore” in Steven D. Anderman, ed., The Interface Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 375 at 399.
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the owner of the mark in Singapore and the owner of the mark abroad are two distinct
entities.47 Still, as in the U.S., if the Singapore trademark and the foreign mark are
owned by related entities, the importation of grey market products is permitted, as
the owner of the Singapore trademark would be deemed to have implicitly consented
to the first sale of the grey market products abroad.48 This rule aims at prevent-
ing multinational corporations from strategically assigning their national trademark
registrations to separate (yet related) subsidiaries in order to bypass the principle of
international trademark exhaustion and prevent grey market products. Essentially,
trademark owners in Singapore can block parallel imports only when the quality of
the grey market products has been “changed or impaired” after the products have
been put into the market by their legitimate owners and “the use of the registered
trade mark… has caused dilution in an unfair manner of the distinctive character
of the registered trade mark.”49 Trademark owners, in contrast, cannot rely on the
SG Trade Marks Act to prevent the imports of grey market products of different
quality when the products are genuine, that is, when trademark owners themselves
distribute products of a different quality in separate national markets (due to taste
preferences, market conditions, etc.).50 In this instance, trademark owners could
try to rely on the common law action of passing off in order to attempt to block
grey market goods of a different quality, even though it would be up to the courts
to decide on the merit of each individual case whether these products are infringing
products.51
Like the U.S. post-Kirtsaeng, Singapore follows a system of international exhaus-
tion also in copyright law, at least since the 1994 Amendment Act, which amended
the SG 1987 Copyright Act.52 Prior to 1994, it was unclear whether the importation
of grey market copyrighted goods in Singapore could constitute, under certain cir-
cumstances, copyright infringement under ss. 32 and 104 of the SG 1987 Copyright
Act—according to which the importation for the purpose of sale or hire and other
commercial activity of an article for which “the importer knows or ought reasonably
to know that the making of the article was carried out without the consent of the owner
of the copyright” constitutes copyright infringement.53 Notably, until 1994, it was
unclear from the statutory text whether the “consent” at issue ought to be the consent
given by the copyright owner in Singapore or, instead, the copyright owner in the
country where the products had first been distributed. In 1993, the Singapore High
47 SG Trade Marks Act, ibid., s. 27. See Pan-West (Pte) Ltd v. Grand Bigwin Pte Ltd [2003] 4 S.L.R.(R.)
755 (H.C.), where the court found that the goods were genuine goods in Japan but not genuine parallel
imports into Singapore because the plaintiff/Singapore trademark owner and the Japanese trademark
owner were not related.
48 The decision in Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. [1980] Fleet Street Reports 85 (C.A.) is the authority in
this respect: see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, The Law of Intellectual Property in Singapore, rev. ed. (Singapore:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at para. 24.8.8 [Ng-Loy, Singapore IP Law].
49 SG Trade Marks Act, supra note 45, s. 29(2).
50 See Beecham Group Plc v. Chinheh Trading (S) Pte Ltd [1992] SGHC 93.
51 See Ng-Loy, Singapore IP Law, supra note 48 at paras. 24.8.15, 24.8.16, referring to Castrol Limited
v. Automotive Oil Supplies Limited [1983] R.P.C. 315, which was successively confirmed in Colgate-
Palmolive Limited v. Maxwell Finance Limited [1989] R.P.C. 497.
52 See also George Wei, The Law of Copyrights in Singapore, 2nd ed. (Singapore: SNP Editions, 2000)
at paras. 8.199-8.224 [Wei, Law of Copyrights].
53 SG 1987 Copyright Act, supra note 10, ss. 32, 104.
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Court clarified this interpretation in Public Prosecutor v. Teo Ai Nee.54 In that case,
reading the provision(s) in combination with s. 25(2), the Chief Justice concluded
that it was the copyright owner in Singapore whose consent was relevant for the pur-
pose of determining if the imported copies were infringing.55 As a result of Teo Ai
Nee, Singapore found itself following a twofold system: (1) international copyright
exhaustion for the works that had the same owners in the country(ies) of origin of the
grey market products and Singapore; and (2) national copyright exhaustion for the
works for which the copyrights was held by different copyright owners in Singapore
and abroad. Less than a year after Teo Ai Nee was decided, however, the Singapore
legislature overturned the decision and passed the 1994 Amendment Act56 in order
to resolve this differential treatment. Notably, the Act inserted s. 25(3), according
to which “the reference to the owner of the copyright” indicates “the person enti-
tled to the copyright in respect of its application to the making of an article of that
description in the country where the article was made” even if the same person did
not own the copyright in Singapore.57 As part of the same statutory reforms, the
Singapore legislature also implemented s. 25(4), which provides that the existence
of the copyright owners’consent is determined without regard to any “condition as to
the sale, distribution or other dealings in the article after its making”.58 Accordingly,
grey market copyrighted products are considered legitimate imports in Singapore
regardless of the fact that the copyright owner in the country of first sale—Germany,
India, Australia, and so forth—intended to restrict product distribution to a certain
territory, which did not include Singapore.
In addition to clarifying the meaning of “consent”, the 1994 Amendment Act intro-
duced an ad hoc provision prohibiting the enforcement of copyright protection for
accessories in the context of parallel imports. Notably, s. 40A(1) was introduced,
which provides that the importation and distribution of an “accessory to an article
is not infringed by a person who, without the license of the owner of the copyright,
imports the article into Singapore… unless the article is an infringing copy.”59 The
same principle was also introduced in the new s. 116A(1) with respect to “a published
edition of a work embodied in an accessory to an article” and “a sound recording
or cinematograph film that is an accessory to an article”.60 The origin of these
provisions can probably be traced to the discussions on copyright reforms (which
included a proposal for a similar provision) in Australia in the late 1980s and early
1990s after the problematic decision in the case of R A & A Bailey & Co. Ltd. v. Boc-
caccio Pty Ltd.61 Ultimately, as we discuss in the next section, Australia introduced
54 [1993] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 755 [Teo Ai Nee] (finding that, under s. 25(2), the consent relevant to assess whether
the copyright owner had consented to the distribution of the products was the consent of the copyright
owner in Singapore; the same applied to the interpretation of consent with respect to the manufacturing
of the products).
55 See Wei, Law of Copyrights, supra note 52 at para. 8.203.
56 The 1994 Amendment Act was passed on 25 August 1994 and commenced on 1 October 1994: see Wei,
Law of Copyrights, ibid. at para. 8.209.
57 SG 2006 Copyright Act, supra note 10, s. 25(3).
58 Ibid., s. 25(4).
59 Ibid., s. 40A(1).
60 Ibid., s. 116A(1).
61 [1986] 6 Intellectual Property Reports 279 (N.S.W.S.C.) [R A & A Bailey].
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a similar provision into the Australian Copyright Act 1968 in 1998.62 Hence, unlike
Singapore, Australia applies, with some relevant exceptions, the more protectionist
position of national exhaustion (and attempts to shift towards a broad rule of inter-
national exhaustion have not been successful so far), thus a provision prohibiting
copyright liability was necessary in Australia to prevent businesses from invoking
copyright protection for product accessories, and in turn leveraging such protection
to bypass the general rule of international trademark exhaustion which applied, and
still applies, in Australia. By contrast, since Singapore follows a system of inter-
national exhaustion both for trademark and copyright law, businesses in Singapore
already lacked the option to turn to copyright law as an end-run around trademark law.
Still, even for a country applying a principle of international copyright exhaustion
like Singapore, the introduction of provisions like ss. 40A(1) and 116A(1) repre-
sents an important step in order to lay down, as a general rule, a specific prohibition
against what could otherwise be perceived as using copyright in a “wholly inappro-
priate” manner “against the consumer interests”.63 Moreover, these provisions could
become particularly important for Singapore in the event of a future change from
international to national copyright exhaustion as preferred (or required) national pol-
icy. As we mentioned in Part II, such a change is being advocated by the U.S. as
part of the ongoing TPP negotiations,64 in which Singapore is a participant. Perhaps
precisely because of this, the (leaked) drafts of the TPP have included an exclusion
from a parallel imports ban for copyrighted products for copyright accessories.65
In addition to the general principle laid out in ss. 40A(1) and 116A(1), the 1994
Amendment Act introduced a detailed definition of “accessory” in s. 7(1). In par-
ticular, the provision defines “accessories” to include labels, packaging, containers,
leaflets, pamphlets, certificates, warranties, brochures, “written instructions or other
information” that are incidental to the article, as well as instructional sound record-
ings and films that are incidental to the article.66 Section 7(1) nonetheless excludes
certain items from this list. Namely, the definition of “accessories” does not include
“a copy of the work that is incorporated into the surface of the article and is a perma-
nent part of the article” or that “cannot be separated from the article without rendering
the article unsuitable for its ordinary use”.67 Similarly, the definition of “accessory”
62 (Cth.), ss. 10(1), 44C, 112C, as am. by Copyright Amendment Act (No. 1) 1998 (Cth.) [Aust. Copyright
Act 1968].
63 Wei, Law of Copyrights, supra note 52, at para. 8.213.
64 See TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12, arts. QQ.G.3, QQ.G.17.
65 The August 2013 draft of the TPP includes a provision offering a specific exclusion from a parallel
imports ban for products carrying copyrighted accessories, which is seemingly proposed by the U.S.:
see TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, ibid., art. QQ.G.3, n. 135:
[US: With respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been placed on the market by the
relevant right holder, the obligations described in Article [QQ.G.3] apply only to books, journals,
sheet music, sound recordings, computer programs, and audio and visual works (i.e., categories of
products in which the value of the copyrighted material represents substantially all of the value of
the product).
The footnote continues, however, stating that “each Party may provide the protection described in Article
[QQ.G.3] to a broader range of goods.” An identical provision was included in TPP IP Chapter Draft
Feb. 2011, supra note 25, art. 4.2, n. 11.
66 SG 2006 Copyright Act, supra note 10, s. 7(1).
67 Ibid.
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excludes “a manual sold with computer software for use in connection with that soft-
ware”.68 In addition to these specific exclusions, the 1994 Amendment Act clarified
in ss. 40A(2) and 116A(2) that the new provisions only affect cases where copyright
is asserted with respect to copyrighted accessories and do not apply where the copy-
right is asserted with respect to “a work embodied in the article or a sound recording
or cinematographic film”69—in other words, “where the copyright subject-matter
is part of the article itself”.70 Here again, this clarification remains, for the time
being, primarily a theoretical exercise—since Singapore law allows the importation
of all copyrighted products from overseas under ss. 25(2), (3) and (4), the definitional
distinction elaborated in ss. 40A(2) and 116A(2) does not have relevance in prac-
tice because all types of copyrighted works (whether accessories, integral parts of
products, or products in their entirety) would still be considered legitimate imports
under the general rule. This definitional distinction would become crucial, to the
contrary, should Singapore shift to a system of national exhaustion in the future, like
(for the most part) Australia or the U.S. pre-Kirtsaeng. In this event, the unautho-
rised importation of uncopyrighted products carrying copyrighted accessories would
be non-infringing, while the importation of copyrighted works that are “part of the
article itself” would be infringing.71
Finally, one of the most remarkable (and perhaps most currently relevant) features
of the 1994 Amendment Act introductions is the fact that ss. 40A(1) and 116A(1)
do not expressly require that the accessories applied to the imported products be
non-infringing—in other words, the provisions seem to permit the importation of
genuine grey market products carrying non-authorised copies of copyrighted acces-
sory works. Notably, ss. 40A(1) and 116A(1) explicitly require only that the articles
to which the accessories are affixed should be non-infringing copies (of copyrighted
works lawfully distributed with the consent of the copyright owners overseas). The
provisions are silent, however, over whether the ‘works embodied in an accessory to
a non-infringing article’ should also be non-infringing. As we highlight in the next
section, this differs from the approach adopted, in 1998, in the Copyright Amendment
Act (No. 1) 199872 that introduced the Australian provision on copyright protection
for accessories: under the Australian provision, the accessories at issue must also be
non-infringing.73 To the contrary, the language of the 1994 Amendment Act could be
interpreted as to permit (or not to oppose) the importation of non-infringing articles
carrying unauthorised accessories, for example an unauthorised copy of a copyrighted
label, written product instructions, brochures, and so forth. As this outcome was most
likely a deliberate choice, this could suggest that the Singapore legislature did not
believe that, on balance, unauthorised copies of accessories could cause significant
harm to copyright owners compared to the benefits of allowing otherwise genuine
goods to be imported into Singapore. Ultimately, under the definition in s. 7(1), the
number of works that qualify as “accessories” remains a narrow category74 and the
Singapore legislature perhaps considered that withholding copyright remedies for
68 Ibid.
69 Wei, Law of Copyrights, supra note 52, para. 8.214.
70 Ibid.
71 See supra note 66.
72 (Cth.) [1998 Amendment Act].
73 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s. 44C(1) [Aust. Copyright Act].
74 SG 1987 Copyright Act, supra note 10, s. 7(1).
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such a limited number of potentially unauthorised accessories was justified by the
goal of reducing the potential for nuisance litigation that could otherwise interfere
with the importation of products that could be lawfully imported under trademark
law. As we elaborate in Part IV, a similar approach may be difficult to apply in
the U.S., even though the courts in the U.S. could find that unauthorised accessories
affixed to otherwise legitimate goods represent only a de minimis, thus not actionable,
infringement,75 or qualify under a fair use exception.76
B. The Australian Model: Combining a Legislative Prohibition Against
“Accessory Copyright” and National Copyright Exhaustion
In Australia, as in the U.S. and Singapore, trademark law offers limited tools against
the importation of grey market products into the domestic territory. In particular, even
though the Trade Marks Act 1995 does not explicitly provide a rule in this respect,77
courts in Australia have established a system of international trademark exhaustion
where Australian trademark owners cannot turn to trademark law to prevent the
importation of non-counterfeit trademarked products.78 As explicitly reminded by
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, trademark law does not operate to prevent
the sale of parallel imports, that is, genuine goods of the proprietor with its trademark
which were not intended for the Australia market.79 More specifically, s. 123 of the
Aust. Trade Marks Act provides that the use of a trademark does not infringe on
the registered owner’s rights “if the trade mark has been applied to, or in relation to,
the goods by, or with [his] consent”.80 During the past two decades, the Australian
75 See Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 at 173 (2nd Cir. 2001): “[i]f a copyright owner were to
sue the makers of trivial copies, judgment would be for the defendants. The case would be dismissed
because trivial copying is not an infringement”; Ringgold v. Black Ent’t Television, 126 F.3d 70 at 74
(2nd Cir. 1997) [Ringgold]: “[u]nderstandably, fact patterns are rarely litigated illustrating this use of
the phrase, for, as Judge Leval has observed, such circumstances would usually involve ‘[q]uestions that
never need to be answered.”’, citing Pierre N. Leval, “Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued” (1997) 44
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1449 at 1457.
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (establishing the elements of fair use); Ringgold, ibid. at 80 (noting that copying
which is too substantial to be de minimis may still qualify as fair use). See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
77 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth.) [Aust. Trade Marks Act].
78 See Polo/Lauren Company L P v. Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] 80 Intellectual Property Reports 531 at
para. 5 (F.C.A.F.C.) [Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.F.C.)], citing Champagne Heidsieck et Cie Monopole Societe
Anonyme v. Buxton [1930] 1 Ch. 330 [Champagne]; Atari, Inc. v. Fairstar Elecs. (1982) 50 A.L.R. 274
(F.C.A.).
79 R A & A Bailey, supra note 61 at 286, which stated that:
[T]he right of exclusive use conferred by s 58 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 upon the registered
proprietor to the exclusive use for the trade mark in relation to goods only operates to prevent the
sale in Australia of goods which are not the proprietor’s but which are marked with the proprietor’s
mark.
80 Supra note 77, s. 123(1). See also ibid., s. 123(2). See e.g., Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd v. Paul’s International
Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 1162 at para. 24 [Sporte Leisure], which highlighted that, “[b]y virtue of s
123 of the Act[,] the respondents will not have infringed the… trade marks by importing or supplying
goods to which the trade marks were applied with the [trade mark owner’s] consent”; Transport Tyre
Sales Pty Ltd v. Montana Tyres Rims and Tubes Pty Ltd (1999) 93 F.C.R. 421 at 433-436 (F.C.A), which
found that the importation of tires from Singapore without the consent of exclusiveAustralian distributor
was lawful because the Japanese owner of the Australian trademark registration had consented to their
manufacture.
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courts have partially narrowed the application of this provision by interpreting the
notion of trademark owners’ consent restrictively—for instance, trademark owners
are usually regarded by the courts as not having consented “to the application of the
mark to goods which the other person knows at the time he or she applies the mark
are to be supplied by him or her outside the territory.”81 Nevertheless, even under
this restrictive interpretation of the notion of consent, it seems that importation of
grey market goods into Australia does not constitute trademark infringement as long
as the trademarked goods were first sold with the consent of trademark owners in
a foreign country and were later imported by a third party from that country into
Australia (without the trademark owners’ consent).82 Trademark owners, however,
remain free to block parallel imports of trademarked products when the products
carry material differences that could result in consumer confusion or tarnishment of
the mark.83
Because they could not rely on trademark law to prevent the importation of grey
market products, intellectual property owners sought alternative avenues to fight
parallel imports also in Australia. As in the U.S. pre-Kirtsaeng, Australian trade-
mark owners found a strong ally in copyright law. Under the Aust. Copyright Act,
the unauthorised importation of copyrighted works distributed overseas, as well as
the public display or distribution of these works in Australia, constitute copyright
infringement.84 As in the U.S., businesses of many sorts, including makers of liquors,
sunglasses, and apparel turned to copyright law to keep grey market products out
of Australia. Here again, when the products could not qualify for copyright pro-
tection in their entirety, businesses claimed protection for those features that could
qualify for copyright protection—again, products’ packages, labels, designs, etc.—
and leveraged the copyright in these features to keep grey market products carrying
these features out of the Australian market. In 1986, this practice was scrutinised
by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the case of R & A Bailey, where the
court, however, had no alternative but to rule for the plaintiff.85 This case referred,
in particular, to the enforceability of copyright protection for the decorative labels
affixed to liqueur bottles. R & A Bailey & Co Ltd (“Bailey”), the manufacturer of the
famous Irish Cream in Ireland, distributed its products in Australia via an authorised
distributor and sued Boccaccio Pty Ltd for importing Bailey’s Irish Cream from the
Netherlands without Bailey’s consent. Bailey claimed both trademark and copyright
infringement because various aspects of the labels affixed to the bottles were pro-
tected under copyright law. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that, while the
defendant did not infringe on Bailey’s trademark by importing and selling legitimate
products bearing the Bailey’s logo, the defendant infringed Bailey’s copyright in the
81 Sporte Leisure, ibid. at para. 78. The court also noted that it would have found consent “but for the fact
that the goods were manufactured… for sale outside [the authorised territory]”: ibid. at para. 90. On
appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia confirmed and stressed that the licensee who
placed the mark on goods which it intended to distribute in unauthorised territories “stood in no different
position to a third party applying the… marks who had no license agreement” with the trademark owner:
Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd v. Sporte Leisure Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 51 at para. 70.
82 But see Brother Industries, Ltd v. Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd [2007] 73 Intellectual Property Reports
507 (F.C.A.).
83 Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.F.C.), supra note 78 at para. 5, citing Champagne, supra note 78.
84 Aust. Copyright Act, supra note 73, s. 37.
85 R A & A Bailey, supra note 61.
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labels.86 In particular, the court found no legal reason, under the law as it stood in
1986, to restrict producers to only one type of intellectual property protection—the
court said that “a person who has both a trade mark and a copyright is generally
entitled to protection against both.”87
This judicial victory was controversial, however, and shortly after the decision in R
& A Bailey, the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee endorsed overturning
the Supreme Court’s decision. Specifically, the Committee advocated for introducing
a legislative amendment, which would prohibit using copyright law as a shield against
otherwise legitimate grey market products.88 More precisely, the Committee stated
that “distributors should not be able to control the market for their products by
resorting to the subterfuge of devising a label or a package in which copyright will
subsist.”89 The Committee also repeated that the “purpose of copyright is to protect
articles which are truly copyrighted articles such as books, sound recordings, or
films.”90 Emphatically, the Committee noted that “[h]owever imaginatively labelled
or packaged a bottle or liquor may be, the product is liquor” and the same “may
be said of cigarettes, perfume and cosmetics.”91 Still, it took over a decade for the
Australian Federal Parliament to take action in this respect and put an end to the
practice adopted by Bailey and many others. Finally, in 1998, the Australian Federal
Parliament passed the 1998 Amendment Act, which added/amended ss. 44C, 112C
and 10(1) to the Aust. Copyright Act.92 As noted in the Schedules accompanying
the Act, the purpose of the 1998 amendment was “that the force of copyright law
was never meant to apply to the contents of the bottle of liqueur which is really the
subject of the importation.”93 Alluding to R & A Bailey as the landmark example
of how copyright protection could be easily misused to bypass the rule of trademark
law, the Act introduced s. 44C into the Aust. Copyright Act. According to s. 44C,
“[t]he copyright in a work a copy of which is, or is on, or embodied in, a non-
infringing accessory to an article is not infringed by importing the accessory with the
article.”94 In parallel, the Act introduced s. 10(1), providing a detailed list of what
constitutes an “accessory” within the meaning of s. 44C, namely labels, packaging,
containers, instructions, warranties, “or other information,” as well as instructional
sound recording or films, “provided with the article”.95 The Australian legislature
further expanded this list, in 2003, with the adoption of a subsequent amendment
86 R A & A Bailey, ibid. at 289, 290, citing Tavener Rutledge Ltd v. Specters Ltd (No 2) [1959] R.P.C. 83
(H.C.), aff’d [1959] R.P.C. 355 (C.A.), and Ogden Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Kis (Australia) Pty. Ltd. [1982]
2 N.S.W.L.R. 283 at 300 (N.S.W.S.C.).
87 Ibid.
88 Copyright Law Review Committee, The Importation Provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988) at 224-226, cited in Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.F.C.), supra




92 Supra note 73, amending s. 10(1) and adding ss. 44C, 112C.
93 Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth.), Schedule 3.
94 Supra note 73, s. 44C(1).
95 Interestingly, Olympic symbols are expressly excluded from this definition, thus, labels, packaging, or
containers carrying Olympic symbols continue to be infringing even after the enactment of the 1998
amendments: see Aust. Copyright Act, supra note 73, s. 10(1); Australian Olympic Insignia Protection
Act of 1987 (Cth.).
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to the Aust. Copyright Act. In particular, s. 10AD was introduced in 2003, which
states that a “computer program”, “electronic literary or music item”, or “sound
recording” that are part of or combined with imported articles are “accessories” within
the meaning of ss. 44C, 112C and 10(1).96 Unlike Singapore (where international
exhaustion remains the general rule),97 the Australian legislature ultimately decided
to consider as “accessories” certain types of works fully embodied in an article, such
as software, electronic, literary and music items, and sound recordings with the only
exception of “feature films”.98 This decision likely came as a compromise between
a shift towards international exhaustion for all products, or maintaining national
exhaustion—Australia ultimately took the latter approach but expanded the scope of
exhaustion by subject matter with the adoption of s. 10AD.99
Despite the lists provided by ss. 10(1) and 10AD, doubts continued to linger, and
still linger, with respect to the specific meaning of what constitutes an “accessory”
under the new Australian law. As later cases have indicated, the courts in Australia
have been so far able to only partially clarify these doubts as the courts themselves
have been wrestling with the uneasy task of drawing the (sometimes very fine) line
between what should be defined as an accessory under ss. 44C, 10(1) and 10AD,
and elements that do not constitute accessories either because they are essential
decorative features of the articles in question or are not sufficiently related to the
products to be considered accessories. In particular, in 2008, the Federal Court of
Australia provided some initial guidelines in this respect when it interpreted the new
provision, for the first time, in The Polo/Lauren Co LP v. Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd.
(Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.))100 This case, the court held that the popular Ralph Lauren
polo player logo, which was woven into the plaintiff’s shirts, was a “label”, and thus
an “accessory”.101 As a result, the plaintiff could not rely on the copyright in the
logo to block the unauthorised importation into Australia of grey market Polo/Lauren
shirts that had been purchased abroad. To reach this result, the court adopted a broad
definition of the term “label”. Specifically, the court argued that the logo as a symbol
of the “brand name, trade mark and the name [of] a design or fashion house”,102
could be considered as a type of “label”. Based upon this premise, the court found
96 SeeAust. CopyrightAct, ibid., s. 10AD, which was introduced by Copyright Amendment (Parallel Impor-
tation) Act 2003 (Cth.). This provision explicitly excludes from a “featured film” form the definition of
an “accessory”. For a definition of “featured film”, see Aust. Copyright Act, ibid., s. 10AD(2).
97 See discussion above at Part III.A.
98 Supra note 73, s. 10AD(2).
99 Australia is also a negotiating member of the TPP. Should the language of art. QQ.G.3, n. 135, of the TPP
IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12 be adopted, s. 10AD may need to be amended, as the types
of works listed in the provision could be “categories of products in which the value of the copyrighted
material represents substantially all of the value of the product”. See also the quote in note 65 above. The
same provision was included in the previous TPP IP Chapter Draft Feb. 2011, supra note 25, art. 4.2,
n. 11. The TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013 shows, however, that Australia currently seems to adopt
a contradictory position on copyright exhaustion. On one side, Australia opposes national copyright
exhaustion along with Peru, New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Chile, Mexico, and Japan: see supra note
12, art. QQ.G.3. On the other side, Australia supports the U.S. against the other negotiating members,
which are proposing a rule of international exhaustion for all products: see ibid., art. QQ.G.17.
100 [2008] 75 I.P.R. 143 (F.C.A.) [Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.)].
101 Ibid. at para. 64.
102 Ibid. at para. 51. This case was appealed to the Full Court. The Full Court noted that this interpretation
did not reject other more common applications of the term “label”, such as swing tags and other physical
labels: see Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.F.C.), supra note 78 at paras. 13-15. The Full Court, very interestingly,
270 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2013]
that the embroidered polo player logo was a label, and not a decorative feature that
should be protected by copyright. Notably, the court stated that an element is an
“accessory” when “[t]he function which [the element]… performs is incidental to
the use of the article as an item of commerce” and thus “[t]he article can be used for
its intended purpose regardless of whether the… ‘accessory’ is present on it or as part
of it.”103 More specifically, under this functionality test, the court concluded that
“[t]he embroidered polo player logo is not primarily a decorative feature, although
it can be attractive to the eye in some of its manifestations.”104 Moreover, the court
added that the:105
[L]ogo will usually remain covered by the wearer’s outer clothing when it appears
on the hem of an item of underwear… at least on such a garment, its function is
primarily to signify the manufacturer’s identity, that is, to act as a label.
Interestingly, after this decision, Ralph Lauren started to magnify the polo player
logo on it garments, perhaps in the hope that a considerably larger polo player logo
would qualify as “primarily a decorative feature”106 of the products rather than being
considered simply a label.
Three years later, in 2011, the same court again addressed the definition of acces-
sory in QS Holdings SARL v. Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd (ACN 114 419 242).107 This
time, the court’s approach had some striking differences from the approach taken
in Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.). This case concerned the importation of both genuine and
counterfeit apparel bearing the plaintiffs’ registered trademarks. The court granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment of trademark infringement with respect
to the counterfeit goods108 but not the genuine goods, because the latter constituted
legitimate trademarked imports. However, several plaintiffs raised the additional
claim of copyright infringement, because the clothing carried graphic design ele-
ments, and images of the clothing, including the graphic design elements, were
reproduced in the defendant’s sales brochures. This time, the court agreed with
the plaintiffs and held that the defendant would be liable for copyright infringe-
ment with respect to the unauthorised importation and domestic sale of the clothing
that bore the authorised reproductions—that is, the genuine products.109 Interest-
ingly, the defendants did not claim that the graphic designs were “accessories”, and
thus that the products’ importation could be legitimate under s. 44C. Perhaps, the
defendants thought that it was unlikely that the court would consider the graphical
designs affixed on the apparel as “accessories” rather than decorative features inte-
gral to the products themselves, based on the test previously adopted in Polo/Lauren
(F.C.A.). The defendants did raise s. 44C with respect to the marketing brochures
that reproduced the copyrighted designs.110 However, the court found that the
also did not accept the argument that the embroidered logo was “conceptually indistinguishable” from
the garment itself: ibid. at para. 22.
103 Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.), supra note 100 at para. 58.
104 Ibid. at para. 63.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 [2011] 92 I.P.R. 460 (F.C.A.) [QS Holdings].
108 Ibid. at para. 37.
109 Ibid. at para. 92.
110 Ibid. at para. 119.
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provision did not apply to the brochures because the brochures were not “acces-
sories” under s. 44C. An “accessory”, the court held, must have “some physical
relationship” with the products to which it relates.111 Accordingly, the plaintiff
was able to use copyright protection in the graphic designs to prevent the impor-
tation and distribution of the grey market clothing as well as the accompanying
brochures.112
Ultimately, based on the combined rulings in Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.) and QS Hold-
ings, Australian courts will likely have to continue to take a case-by-case approach in
drawing the line between true accessories that qualify under the exception set forth
in s. 44C, and elements that are either integral parts of the products or not sufficiently
related to the products, to which s. 44C does not apply. To date, several questions
remain unanswered in this respect, even after the decisions issued by the Federal
Court of Australia. For example, why was the logo woven onto the Polo/Lauren
(F.C.A.) shirt an accessory while the graphics on the QS Holdings shirts were not?
Perhaps, under the functionality test adopted in Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.), the graphics
on the QS Holdings shirts constituted an integral part of the product or played a larger
role in making the overall product more attractive, rather than merely communicating
the provenance of the garment, even though it is undoubted that the polo player logo
constitutes one of the most wanted features of a Ralph Lauren apparel.113 Almost cer-
tainly, the fact that the polo player logo is a registered trademark did not assist Ralph
Lauren, as its resort to copyright law was obviously a stratagem to bypass interna-
tional trademark exhaustion, under which the same products were legitimate imports
into Australia. As Ralph Lauren started to do soon after the Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.)
decision, manufacturers may also attempt to integrate their trademarks more fully in
their product designs in order to claim that their copyrighted/trademarked features
fall outside the definition of product accessories and could be categorised, instead,
as integral parts of the products. These ‘trademark magnifying’ techniques may
backfire, however, if the decorative features are expanded to the point of becoming
functional elements of the products, as this may result in the loss of both trademark
and copyright protection.114 For example, Australian copyright law prohibits over-
lapping copyright and design protection, which can result in withdrawing copyright
protection for artistic works when the works have been industrially applied.115 In
the end, the application of s. 44C in Australia will continue to require that courts
carefully weigh how much value, as decorative elements, the features under consid-
eration add to the products. Based on the result of this inquiry, the courts will decide,
111 Ibid. at para. 124, additionally reasoning that s. 44C applies only to accessories that are imported, and
there was no indication that the brochures had been imported.
112 Ibid.
113 In the U.S., see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 at 213, 214 (2000)
(decorative features of apparel could not be protected as trade dress absent secondary meaning).
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (barring trademark registration for functional features); TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (features of product design previously patented are
presumed functional and cannot be protected by trademark law) [TrafFix]; Avia Group International,
Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (feature that is “primarily functional” is
not eligible for design patent). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining useful articles); Brandir International,
Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2nd Cir. 1987) (denying copyright protection for
utilitarian aspects of useful article that were inseparable from artistic aspects).
115 Aust. Copyright Act, supra note 73, s. 77.
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on balance, whether these features are copyrighted accessories under the meaning of
ss. 44C, 10(1), and 10AD of the Aust. Copyright Act.
IV. A Proposal for a Legislative Amendment Against “Accessory
Copyright” in the U.S.
Drawing on the Singaporean and Australian examples, it seems clear that the
U.S. would also benefit from the adoption of a specific legislative solution that would
exempt incidental uses of copyrighted product accessories from possibly-applicable
restrictions on parallel imports imposed by copyright law. As we elaborate in this
paragraph, such a provision would become particularly relevant in the event that
Congress overrules the decision in Kirtsaeng and restores national copyright exhaus-
tion as the applicable rule in the U.S. Moreover, a legislative solution offers greater
legal certainty for all interested parties, compared to a judicial solution. Even though
the courts could apply existing judicial doctrines—such as de minimis infringement,
copyright misuse, or fair use116—to redress the negative effects of overlapping copy-
right and trademark protection for parallel imports, the application of these doctrines
always requires (expensive) litigation and case-by-case adjudication, whose fact-
driven outcomes remain difficult to predict and, more problematically, could result
in judicial decisions limiting the scope of these doctrines in other contexts as well. In
contrast, the narrowly tailored statutory exception that we advocate would restore the
balance of rights that are established under copyright and trademark law respectively.
Ultimately, we are well aware that a statutory exemption for copyrighted accessories
will not be a panacea against possible questions of statutory interpretation as to what
represents an “accessory”. In this respect, the cases decided in Australia demon-
strate that the interpretation of statutory language will (almost unavoidably) remain
a challenge for the courts in applying the normative provision.117 Still, the range of
uncertainty that may be derived from a carefully-crafted legislative amendment will
be considerably narrower than the uncertainty that arises from applying ambiguous
concepts such as de minimis infringement, copyright misuse, or fair use.
Accordingly, building upon the provisions that have been implemented in Sin-
gapore and Australia, we advocate that the U.S. Congress consider introducing
into the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 a statutory exception for incidental uses of
copyrighted features—which we call “accessories” in our proposal—with respect
to parallel imports and the further sales of grey market products. This legisla-
tive amendment, in our view, should consist of a two-part provision: first, the
suggested provision should include a non-exhaustive list indicating specifically the
types of features and uses of those features that, regardless of copyright protection
therein, should be exempt from restrictions on importation and subsequent distri-
bution because their use on the products is incidental; second, the provision should
116 With respect to de minimis copyright infringement, see Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 at 173
(2nd Cir. 2001); Ringgold, supra note 75 at 74. With respect to copyright misuse, see Costco Wholesale
Corporation v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010); Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. Wiredata,
Inc., 350 F.3d 640 at 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); Practice Management Information Corporation v. The
American Medical Association, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). For copyright fair use, see 17 U.S.C. § 107;
Ringgold, ibid. at 80; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
117 QS Holdings, supra note 107; Polo/Lauren (F.C.A.), supra note 100.
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include a general “catch-all exception” for the occasional incidental feature that
would fall outside of the list delineated in the first part of the provision, but would
still refer to situations where copyright law is used anti-competitively as an end-run
around trademark law. By borrowing elements both from the Singapore andAustralia
statutes, a specific provision eliminating copyright liability for parallel imports of
copyrighted accessories accompanying grey market goods in the U.S. could read as
follows:118
Where a copyrighted work is incorporated in an accessory to an article, the copy-
right embodied in the accessory is not infringed by a person who imports the article
into the U.S. or by the domestic distribution of the imported article with the acces-
sory without the consent of the copyright owner, provided that the accessory is a
non-infringing accessory.
As we mentioned, the U.S. legislature should also implement a non-exclusive but
detailed list of what constitutes an “accessory” within the meaning of the provision
and should include in this list a general, catch-all clause. In particular, the legislative
text could state that:
For purposes of this section, “accessory”, in relation to an article, means one or
more of the following:
(a) A label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or
accompanying, the article;
(b) The packaging or container in which the article is packaged or contained;
(c) A label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of,
or accompanying, the packaging or container in which the article is
packaged or contained;
(d) A written instruction, warranty or other information provided with the
article;
(e) A phonorecord embodying an instructional sound recording provided
with the article;
(f) A copy of an instructional audiovisual work provided with the article; or
(g) Any other feature of the article, its packaging or its container, or any
accompanying object, that contributes an insubstantial part of the value
of the combination, apart from the trademark value of the feature.
In contrast with s. 7(1) of the SG 2006 Copyright Act, we do not suggest that this
list should include any specific exclusions from the definition of “accessory”.119
Moreover, in contrast with s. 10AD of the Aust. Copyright Act, we do not advocate
118 This language could be expanded in order to include accessories that are not infringing in the country
where they were made, even if they were not authorised by the copyright owner in that country. This
would include accessories made in countries where the copyright expired, where the work did not qualify
for copyright protection, or where the copying was permitted by law. Should such approach be adopted,
the country of manufacture should be a member country of the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886 (entered into force 5 December 1887) as last revised at
Paris on 24 July 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (entered into force 15 December 1972), and amended on 28
September 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986), online: World Intellectual Property Organization
<www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf>, or TRIPs, supra note 3.
119 Supra note 10.
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that broader categories of copyrighted products such as “computer programs,” “elec-
tronic, literary, or music items”, or “sound recordings” per se should be included in
the definition of “accessory”.120 Instead, under our proposal, the crucial inquiry to
assess whether a specific product feature represents an accessory within the meaning
of our suggested amendment would focus on the value that the copyrighted feature
contributes to the overall commercial value of the article to which it is attached.121
In particular, we advocate that a given feature should be considered to be an “acces-
sory” within the meaning of the proposed amendment when the contribution of this
feature to the overall value of the article that is imported is “insubstantial”. Based
upon the language of our proposal, product features that can be categorised as items
falling under the definitions of subsections (a)-(f) in the suggested provision will
almost invariably be considered “insubstantial” accessories. Additional product fea-
tures whose uses do not fall within the detailed list could still be considered as having
“insubstantial” value based upon the catch-all exception in subsection (g). A product
feature that falls within the detailed list of subsections (a)-(f), or under the general
exception of subsection (g), should thus be considered an “accessory”, and the copy-
right in that feature should not preclude the importation and domestic sale of the
article to which the feature is attached. By contrast, when a product feature con-
tributes “substantially” to the value of the products to which it is affixed, the feature
should be considered an integral part of the product and copyright protection should
apply, even in the context of parallel imports. To turn to some practical examples, the
(copyrighted) decorative elements that are affixed on the box of a tablet computer, a
smart-phone, or a DVD videogame will certainly not have “substantial” value with
respect to the overall value of the products themselves—the tablet, smart-phone, and
video game—and thus should be considered product accessories of “insubstantial”
value. In contrast, the software embedded in the tablet, smart-phone, and videogame
is perhaps one of the most valuable components of the products and should be held
to be a non-accessory because of its “substantial” value.
Under our proposed amendment, there will be cases where it would still be dif-
ficult to assess the actual value that a copyrighted feature contributes to the overall
value of the product to which it is affixed. This may be the case, for instance, when
an appealing design or packaging feature contributes to the product’s appeal to con-
sumers more than the product self. In this respect, it would be hard to argue that
a bar of chocolate, which is shaped as Mickey Mouse or Angry Birds, or which is
sold in a package that is shaped as the characters, does not derive, overall, high value
from the use of the characters. In this case, the copyrighted feature (the charac-
ters) would unlikely fit within our proposed definition of accessories because they
would have “substantial” value for the sale of the products. The outcome may be
different, however, for other types of chocolate bars (and many other products). For
120 Supra note 73.
121 This is similar to the approach suggested by Bastarache J. in Canada in his minority opinion in Euro-
Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc. [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 at paras. 94, 95 (Bastarache, LeBel, and
Charron, JJ.). In our proposal, we refer to the “substantial” or “insubstantial” value of the product
features in question with respect to the value of these features as copyrighted articles. We do not
suggest, nor support, that the assessment of this value should take into account the value of the same
features as trademarks, trade dress, or product get-ups, i.e. their value as source indicators and their
reputation-related value.
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example, consumers probably do not purchase Toblerone or Cote D’Or chocolate
bars because the packages of the chocolate prominently feature a copyrighted deco-
ration consisting, respectively, of a mountain or an elephant, or because the chocolate
is mountain-shaped or has an elephant engraved in the chocolate. In these instances,
both the copyrighted mountain and the elephant would most likely be considered
“accessories” under our proposed definition of “accessories” because their value is
likely “insubstantial” for the sale of the products.122 Still, since no decision has
been issued to date in the U.S. to provide specific guidance in defining what should
be considered a copyrighted element that adds substantial value to the product that
it accompanies, we recognise that it will remain for the courts to develop specific
tests in this respect. As it has been the case in Australia, in the U.S., the courts will
most likely have to engage in line-drawing distinctions between features that are
true “accessories” and those that are not. Our proposed amendment, however, will
provide the courts with a comprehensive and detailed normative foundation for their
future decisions. Naturally, we acknowledge that the courts’ decisions will neces-
sarily be fact-driven. Thus, the judicial determination whether a copyrighted feature
represents an “accessory” will still depend on a case-by-case fact-intensive analysis.
As we noted in Part B, with respect to Australia, the adoption of an exception
for copyrighted features with “insubstantial” value may lead manufacturers in the
U.S. to integrate these features more fully into their products—like Mickey Mouse
or Angry Birds shaped chocolate—in order to claim that these features are “sub-
stantially” valuable parts of the products and thus non-accessory. In some cases,
these techniques (which frequently simply amount to enlarging these features) could
be successful, because the appearance of a product may be more important than
its functionality (the consumers of Mickey Mouse or Angry Birds chocolate most
likely do not buy the products for the chocolate). However, in other cases, these
magnifying techniques could backfire and intellectual property owners could sud-
denly find themselves without copyright or trademark protection. In particular,
under U.S. copyright law, copyright protection applies only if the design remains
non-functional,123 while under U.S. trademark law, trademark protection does not
apply when the claimed features are functional either in a utilitarian or an aes-
thetic sense.124 Ultimately, the adoption of the suggested amendment focusing on
the substantial/insubstantial value of incidental copyrighted features could finally
122 Ibid. See also Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, “La Confusion des Genres: Logos and Packaging as Copy-
righted Works” in Irene Calboli & Edward Lee, eds., Trademark Protection and Territoriality Challenges
in a Global Economy [Edward Elgar, forthcoming in 2014].
123 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of useful articles); Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber
Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2nd Cir. 1987) (applying § 101 to deny copyright protection where the utilitarian
aspects of a useful article were inseparable from its artistic aspects).
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (barring trademark registration for functional features); TrafFix, supra note
115 (features of expired utility patent are presumed functional and therefore cannot be protected by
trademark law); International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg And Company, 633 F.2d 912
(9th Cir. 1980) (fraternity logo found aesthetically functional when applied to jewellery); Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) (establishing the doctrine of aesthetic functionality).
See also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (the “Betty Boop”
character was aesthetically functional and not protectable as a trademark) withdrawn by 654 F.3d 958
(9th Cir. 2011); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., No. 925 F. Supp.2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(the word mark “Betty Boop” was aesthetically functional to describe competitor products consisting
of dolls representing the “Betty Boop” character).
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put an end to, or considerably diminish, intellectual property owners’ inappropriate
and distortive use of copyright law for incidental product features in the U.S., in
particular under a reinstated rule of national exhaustion should Congress overrule
Kirtsaeng. Equally important, the language of the proposed amendment seems to be
compatible with the U.S.’s international obligations under the U.S.-Jordan FTA and
U.S.-Morocco FTA.125 The (leaked) drafts of the TPP indicate, furthermore, that the
same USTR may support such an exception for “accessory copyright”. Notably, as
a general exception to the U.S. position against parallel imports in the TPP, a foot-
note in the drafts (seemingly proposed, or at least supported, by the USTR) states
that the rights to block parallel imports may “apply only to books, journals, sheet
music, sound recordings and audio and visual works (i.e., categories of products in
which the value of the copyrighted material represents substantially all of the value
of the product).”126 In other words, under the TPP, countries would remain free
to exclude from the general rule of parallel imports copyrighted features that do
not have “substantial” value. As in our proposed amendment, this includes prod-
uct accessories that contribute an “insubstantial part of the value” of the imported
merchandise.
V. Conclusion
In March 2013, the Supreme Court of the U.S. changed the international trade land-
scape with its decision in Kirtsaeng—intellectual property owners could no longer
resort to copyright law in order to avoid the limitations imposed by trademark law
with respect to blocking grey market products imported into the U.S. Only time
will tell, however, whether this change will be permanent, as intensive Congres-
sional activity is currently taking place to comprehensively reform copyright law
in the U.S. Future copyright reforms may include overturning the Supreme Court
and clarifying that the U.S. follows (again) national copyright exhaustion. As Justice
Ginsburg argued in her dissent in Kirtsaeng, such a shift back may even be required to
realign the domestic position with the obligations that the U.S. has assumed with (or
perhaps forced upon) other countries at the international level. Yet, should Congress
overturn Kirtsaeng, copyright law could again be exploited as a type of mutant trade-
mark protection against parallel imports. This will again permit intellectual property
owners to bypass the pro-competitive policy of trademark law and replace it with
the more monopolistic-driven protection of copyright law. Accordingly, Congress
should consider adopting a legislative amendment that would prevent copyright law
from encroaching on trademark law with respect to the protection of product acces-
sories in the context of parallel imports. In this article, we have proposed a legislative
amendment that builds upon the lessons derived from similar initiatives pioneered
by Singapore and Australia. Such a legislative solution would be superior to possible
judicial solutions, as it could reduce the uncertainty that arises from case-by-case
125 A specific exception in this respect appears in a side letter to the U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 25, online:
United States Trade Representative <http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/
morocco/asset_upload_file717_3850.pdf>
126 TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 12, art. QQ.G.3, n. 135 [emphasis added]. The provision
also states that “each Party may [but is not obliged to] provide the protection described in Article
[QQ.G.3] to a broader range of goods”: ibid.
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adjudication. In practice, such an amendment would make it more difficult for trade-
mark owners to exploit overlapping intellectual property rights by substituting one
protection for another by adding trivial copyrightable content to their uncopyrightable
products. In the controversial landscape of international trade negotiations, our pro-
posal seems also compatible with the majority position supported in the (leaked)
drafts of the TPP, and certainly with art. 6 of TRIPs.
